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Abstract 
We develop a two-sec or endogenous growth model with a dual labour market resulting from 
the presence of an effort extraction function in one sector. Effort of workers can be influenced 
by pay and monitoring. This results in an endogenous non-competitive wage differential 
between sectors and a monitoring intensity that is a source of fixed costs for the firm. Growth 
is driven by investments in R&D performed inthe high-wa e sector. Unemployment is deter-
mined by the costs and benefits of waiting for a high-paid job. The wage structure, growth, 
and unemployment are shown to depend on the way effort is extracted. 
 
JEL codes: E24, J21, J53, O41 
Keywords: endogenous growth, unemployment, effort extraction, dual labour market 
 
1. Introduction 
Wages differ considerably across broad sectors of the economy, even after controlling or age, 
education, occupation, gender, and workplace characteristics (cf. OECD, 1994). There re cer ain 
common elements in the estimates of these differences for a number of countr es, e.g., 
manufacturing pre-eminently being the lar e sector paying a relatively high non-competitive wage 
premium, whereas the agricultural sector pays the lowest wages. The apparent willingness of 
employers in imperfectly competitive product markets o sha e rents with their workers introduces 
friction in the market mechanism: the unemployed may prolong their job search in the hope of 
entering high-wage sectors, and workers displaced from these sectors may have very high 
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Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Email: hgroot@feweb.vu.nl, tel. +31 20 444 6168, 
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replacement rates and hence very high reservation wages when benefits are based on previous 
earnings (cf. Kletzer, 1992). In this view, unemployment is determined by outweighing the costs 
and benefits of waiting for a high-paid job. 
 Our starting point is an endogenous growth model with a traditional and a high-tech sector. 
The duality of the economy results in a segmented non-Wa ras an labour market. Our model 
predicts that relative nominal wages are rigid. Labour is homogeneous, but employers in the high-
tech sector are willing to pay efficiency wages for rent-sharing reasons. Thus, workers obtain a 
sector-specific wage rate. The existence of these rents in the imperfectly competitive high-tech 
sector of the economy is the benefit that gives people an incentive to wait for high-paid jobs. We 
generalise the well-known theoretical concept of an efficiency wage relation, in which only the 
wage rate features, by introducing the concept of an effort-extraction func i n (se  also Bowles,
1985, and Mehta, 1998). The basic idea here is that employers have several means of 'extracting' 
effort from their employees. One is by monitoring and supervising the effort of employees, another 
is to pay relatively high wages. Introducing this basic idea in this paper allows us to study the 
effects of for example different organisations of work by firms on growth and unemployment in a 
consistent framework. Firms will optimally set the wage and monitoring intensity as to maximise 
their profits. This is shown to result in a trade- ff between paying high wages and intensive 
monitoring. The monitoring intensity and wage level that result from this optimising behaviour are 
shown to be crucial for both the growth and unemployment performance of an economy. 
  Our model extends the available literature on growth and unemployment in several 
respects. First, our focus is mainly on distortions in the supply of labour causing equilibrium 
unemployment, whereas most of the available studies focus on distortions in demand. Second, we 
model unemployment as resulting from (extended) efficiency wage considerations playing a role in 
one sector only. Third, we address the problem in a general equilibrium model with a segmented 
labour market, characterised by endogenously determined non-comp titive wage differentials. 
Finally, we explicitly model growth as requirin  (rese rch) labour, where the intensity with which 
R&D is performed is determined on the basis of optimising behaviour of firms. 
 We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. It discusses household behaviour, 
firm behaviour and the labour mark t of the model. Section 3 presents the solution of the model. 
Section 4 looks in detail at the properties of the model. It discusses the consequences for growth 
and unemployment of instituionally determined differences in effort extraction functions, capturing 
different ways of organising work. We present our conclusions in section 5. 
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2. A model of R&D and unemployment in a dual economy 
The economy comprises two sectors. There is perfect competition in the product market for 
traditional goods and monopolistic competition in the product market for high-tech goods. Each 
firm in the high- ech sector produces a unique brand of the high-tech good. There are N high-tech 
firms, indexed i = 1, ..., N. In section 3, we elaborate on the determination of thnumber of firms. 
We assume that a high-tech f rm only holds a negligibly small market share, so that competition is 
monopolistically à la Chamberlin. Growth stems from research done in the high-tech sector. Labour
is homogeneous and can be employed in one of the two sectors or can be unemployed. Workers 
earn a sector- pecific wage, while unemployed people get unemployment benefits. In this section, 
we will present the full model. Only the equations constituting the final model are numbered. Where 
there is no danger of confusin, time ndices have been omitted. 
 
2.1 Households 
We assume identical infinite-lived households. Household behaviour is formuated s a three-stage 
budgeting problem. In the first stage, households maximise inter- emporal utility2
 ,s.t.
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where C is a composite good, 1/r is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and q i  the 
subjective discount rate. The dynamic budget constraint describes the development of financial 
assets (A) over time (dtdAA tt /=& ). Households spend income on consumption (CPC) and obtain 
income by working (Iw), and by receiving rental income (rA), over financial assets accumulated in 
the past.3 Households have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the two goods. In the second stage of 
the optimisation problem, they maximise  
 ),10(s.t.
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where Y is the traditional good, X s  bundle of varieties of the high-tech good, andPY and PX are 
the corresponding prices. In addition, households have CES-preferences over the high-tech goods 
(cf. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), so in the final step they maximise 
                                   
2 All the maximizations are stated on a macroeconomic level. We think of each household as being made up of 
a continuum of individuals. We will return to the exact determination of household income in a later stage of 
the paper. For the moment it is important that, irrespective of how household income is determined, we can 
derive the consumption-savings decision. 
3  In equilibrium, aggregate income from financial assets (rA) equals aggregate dividends paid by the firm. We 
will further elaborate on this in footnote 13 where we describe the savings-investment quilibrium. 
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where xi represents the consumed quantity of the high-tech good brand i, e is t e elasticity of 
substitution between any two high-tech goods, N i the number of available varieties of the high-
tech good, and pxi is the price of a single brand of the high-tech good of variety i. 
 The three-st p maximisation procedure yields five equations. In the first step, households 
decide how to divide total income between savings and consumption expenditures. This yields he 
Ramsey rule 
 .   
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This equation relates the growth rate of consumption to the determinants of the consumption-
savings decision. It shows that the rate of growth is high if the r al r turn on sav ngs (CC PPr /&- )
large, if households are patient (q is low), and if households are willing to substitute inter-
temporally (1/r is high). 
 In the second step, households decide how to divide the income they want to spend on 
consumption expenditures between high-tech and traditional goods. Given the Cobb-Douglas 
specification chosen above, this results in 
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Equation (2) tells us that a fixed fraction 1–s of ggregate consumption expenditure CPC is spent 
on traditional goods and a fixed fraction s is spent on high-tech go ds. Equation (3) is the 
definition of the macroeconomic price index. 
 In the last step, households decide how to divide the income they want to spend on high-
tech goods among the N varieties of this good that are available. This yields the demand for a single 
variety of the high-tech good 
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The price-elasticity of demand for any variety of the high-tech good is thus equal to e. From now 
on we employ the assumption of symmetry across firms in the high-tech sector, so that we may 
drop the subscript i. Hence, X =xNe/(e–1) and N = XPX/xpx. Notice that, after employing the 
symmetry assumption, the equation for the circular flow (2) can be written as YPY/Nxpx  = (1–s)/s. 
 
2.2 Firms 
The traditional sector exhibits unitary labour productivity 
 YLY = . (6) 
LY stands for the number of workers employed in this sector and Y is the product onf raditional 
goods. Under perfect competition, the price of a traditional good equals labour cost 
 YY wP = , (7) 
where wY denotes the wage rate in the traditional sector. 
 High-tech firms employ direct labour (Lx) wi h labour productivityh and effort e, o
produce x units of output 
 xehLx= . (8) 
According to this equation, the overall productivity of direct labour (x/Lx) is composed of two 
factors, each determined differently. With respect to the effort (e), we assume he existence of a 
generalised version of the efficiency wage relation that we used in van Schaik and de Groot, 1998.
We will further label this relation the effort-extraction function. The effort of a worker in the high-
tech sector crucially depends on two factors. The first is the wage he earns (wT) relative to the wage 
a worker earns in the traditional sector (wY). The second is the (effective) amount of labour 
employed for monitoring or supervision (S º eLs) 
 2
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where g1 and g2 are the effort-wage and effort monitoring elasticity, respectively.4 We call this th  
'supply of effort'.5 Foll wing Akerlof, 1982 the main reason in our model for high-tech firms t  pay 
                                   
4 We use this terminology for presentational convenience. The 'true' or 'correct' elasticities are endogenous due 
to the constant term a in th  effort extraction function. They equal giW/(–a+W), where W º c(wT/wY)g1Sg2. 
5 In the special case where g2=0, firms will be shown to employ no monitoring labour so S=0. For reaso s of 
continuity, we assume that Sg2 is qual to one when g2=0 (xx approaches 1 if x approaches zero from above).
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efficiency wages is based on sociological considerations. The idea is that each worker has a certain 
perception of the amount of effort that a 'fair' employer can ask from him. The employer can 
influence this fair amount of effort by changing the wage he pays. The more he pays, the higher the 
worker's notion of the fair amount of effort to be supplied to the employer. By paying high wages, 
the firm is thus able to raise the norms of a fair working day and the fair amount of effort to be 
supplied in exchange for that wage. 
The importance of this type of sociological consideration in explaining various phenomena 
in the labour market is increasingly acknowledged (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993, Kahneman et al., 
1986, and Solow, 1980). The assumption that the efficiency wage considerations are only present 
in the high-tech sector is related to the prevailing imperfect competition in this sector. As profits are 
made in this sector only, workers may find it fair to share in these profits and hence ask for a higher 
wage. In that case, it may be in the interest of the profit-maximising firm to offer a higher wage. 
This matches with the empirical literature in which the relation between the operation of an 
efficiency wage relation and some characteristics of the sector like the size of the firm, capital 
intensity or kind of competition, has be n investigated (e.g., Ara , 1994, Brown and Medoff, 1989, 
Dickens and Katz, 1987, Gera and Grenier, 1994, Krueger and Summers, 1988, andvan Reenen, 
1996). In these studies, evidence is found for a significant wage premium for those people working 
in large, innovating firms and in firms that operate in situat on of imperfect competition. This 
research has also revealed that (i) there is an inter-industry wag  structure that is significant and 
persistent over time and (ii) this wage structure cannot be explained solely on the basis of standard 
competitive factors as differences in skills, working conditions, etc. The second factor that 
positively influences the effort exerted by workers is the monitoring intensity (see also Bowle , 
1985). We conceive the elasticities of the effort-extraction unction as an important institutional 
characteristic of the economy. They are characteristic of the way work is being o ganised within 
firms. The importance of institutional and organisational factors on the effort of workers has been 
stressed in (historical) studies on the relation between economic institutions and economic 
performance. The following passage (Lazonick, 1991p. 35) is instructive: 
 
 To overcome restrictions of output and encourage workers o apply their effort to further the 
goals of the enterprise, employers had to assure the workers that promises of higher wages, 
better work conditions, and employment stability would be kept. Most capable of keeping 
such promises were those corporation  that had already attained competitive advantage in 
their product markets. It was these corporations that were already generating value gains 
that could be shared with workers to an extent that other, less advantaged corporations 
could not. The most effective way to implement these incentives was by promising hard-
working, loyal workers long-te m employment security and a rising standard of living both 
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on and off the job. 
 
The variable h can be affected by the firm by doing R&D. Assuming that there is no uncertainty 
with respect to investment in knowledge, employing Lr units of res arch labour yields an increase in 
technology equal to
 rheL = h x& ,  (10) 
where h stands for the stock of knowledge a firm possesses (and which has been built up in the 
past), and x(>0) is a productivity parameter. This specification of the knowledge base implies that 
knowledge is completely int rnal to the firm.6 Finally, firms have to employ a fixed amount of 
labour in efficiency units (F) before being able to produc . One may think here of a fixed amount of 
management required before production can be started. So we require F º eLf. 
 In maximising present discounted value, high-tech firms decide about labour input in the 
production department (Lx), labour input in the research department (Lr), the wage rate (wT), nd
the monitoring intensity (S). Thi  optimisation leaves us with five equation capturing the First 
Order Conditions of the firms' optimisation problem (see Appendix A for a derivation). In this 
approach, we determine the input of research labour on the basis of inter-temporally optimising 
behaviour of the firm. The first equation shows the wage-setting behaviour. Firms will pay higher 
wages as long as the increase in benefits related to the increase in efficiency more than offsets the 
increase in cost in the form of a higher wage bill. This comes down to the well-known Solow 
condition7 
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For the monitoring intensity, we derive 
                                   
6 Alternatively, we could assum that knowledge is only partly internal to the firm. As shown in van Schaik 
and de Groot, 1998, this does not affect the qualitative results. When knowledge is not completely internal to 
the firm, the incentive to engage in research is less, as the firm cannot fully appropriate the benefits that are 
generated through the research. This leads to a lower intensity of research (and therefore a lower growth rate) 
than when there are no knowledge spill- vers. 
7 In van Schaik and de Groot, 1998, we assume that effort-extracti n considerations only apply to production 
workers. Here, we assume that they apply to all igh- ec  workers. One can argue about the most appropriate 
assumption. In any case, only applying efficiency wage consideratio s to produ tion workers yields a 'modified 
Solow condition'. According to this modified Solow condition, the endogenous effort-wage elast c ty is larger 
than one in equilibrium. Increasing the wage by one percent should be accompanied with a more than one 
percent increase in effort, as the higher wage also has to be paid to research labourers and managers/fixed 
labour (of which the productivity is not affected by the wage setting behaviour). 
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Firms increase their monitoring intensity as long as the marginal revenue of doing so exceeds the 
marginal cost. This results in an equilibrium effort-monitoring e ast city tha  is smaller than one (see 
footnote 4). So a one percent increase in the monitoring intens ty only eeds to result in a less than 
one percent increase in effort since this higher effort not only applies to the monitoring labour itself 
but also to production workers, researchers and managers. Combining these two conditions and 
using the endogenous effort-wage and effort-monitoring elasticities (see footnote 4), we can derive 
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This result reveals that in maximising their profits, firms make a trade-off b tween eliciting effort
via paying high wages (high w) and via intensive monitoring (high S). Depending on the relative 
effectiveness of the two available instruments, firms decide on how much to pay their workers and 
how much monitoring labour to employ. The amount of supervision labour as a fraction of the total 
labour force of a firm is equal to the ratio of the effort-moni ring and the effort-wage elasticity 
(g2/g1). An increase in firm size results in other words in an equi-proporti nate increase in the 
amount of supervisors.  
 The third equation describes price-setting behaviour. Given the market power of high-t ch 
firms, they will simply put a mark-up over their wage cost 
 .  
eh
w
 = p Tx
1-e
e
 (13) 
This relation shows that real wages in the high-tech sec orwT / px increase with labour productivity 
h. Unit real labour costs wT / ehpx equal (e–1)/e and are therefore invariant with respect to labour 
productivi y growth. The mark-up is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution b tween any 
two high-tech goods. The closer these goods form substitut s, i.e., the higher e is, t e l ss market 
power firms have, and the lower the mark-up they can put on labour costs. 
 The fourth equation determines optimal research effort 
 .  ehp = w hT x  (14) 
In this formula, ph is the shadow price of the level of technology h. It is a measure of the marginal 
value of an additional unit of h for the firm. According to this equation, a firm equalises the 
marginal revenue of doing research (consisting of an increase in the level of technology a firm can 
 9
use) with the marginal cost of R&D, i.e., the wage bill of a researcher. Combining equations (13)
and (14) leads to ph/px  = (e–1)/(xe). This relation shows that the price (of the input) of knowledge 
in terms of the price (of the output) of the final product will rise if it becomes relatively costly to
generate new knowledge (x is low) and if high-tech goods form closer substitutes (higher e). 
 Finally, we derive the dynamic equation 
 .  
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According to this equation, the marginal cost of an increase in h wh ch con ists of capit l cost r 
should equal the marginal revenue of an increse in h which consists of an addition to the stock of 
knowledge, an increase in production, and a capital gains term, hh pp /& . 
 
2.3 Equilibrium unemployment in a segmented labour market 
An essential characteristic of the model is its segmented labour market. Th  effort- xtraction 
function operating in the high-tech sector leads to primary sector workers receiving a non-
competitive rent (w > 1).8 The existence of these rents is at the heart of the analysis to follow. Each 
individual within ahousehold is striving for the highest possible pay-off (in terms of pr sent 
discounted value). Hence, all individuals would like to be employed in the high-tech sector.9 Th
number of jobs in this sector is, however, limited since consumers want to spend their income on 
both high-tec  and traditional goods (s < 1). We assume that at some exogenous rate d, jobs in the 
high-tech sector become available. Upon being laid off, a worker faces two options. He can either 
decide to take a job in the traditi nal sector (these jobs are freely available), or he can join the pool 
of unemployed. In determining his optimal strategy, the worker has to take the following factors 
into consideration: (i) unemployment benefits are lower than the salaries in the traditional sec or 
(b<wY), and (ii) the probability of being matched with a high-tech job when being in t e traditional 
sector (aq) is lower than when being unemployed (q). The process of weighing the two options 
that laid off high-tech workers face results in an endogenou ly determined probability (h) of 
                                   
8 We restrict the parameters of the effort extraction function in such a way that a non-competitive wage 
differential results (i.e., a/[c(1–g1)Sg2] > 1)
9 We are confronted in this model with the probl m of incorporating a non-Walrasia  l bour market structure 
in a dynamic general equilibrium model (see, e.g., Danthine and Donaldson 1990, and Gali, 1995, for a 
discussion of these problems in the context of a real business cycle model). Though the construction that we 
use here of having a representative household (making the consumption-savings decision) being composed out 
of a continuum of individuals a med at chieving the highest possible pay-off (in term  of present discounted 
value) is admittedly somewhat artificial, it allows us to embody the relation between unemployment and 
endogenous growth in a general equilibrium framework. 
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entering one of the two states (i.e., the state of unemployment or traditional sector employment). 
The outcome for this probability is such that ex-ante laid off workers (which are distributed 
randomly) are indifferent betwe n the two options they face. 
 Figure 1 presents a stylised interpretation of the labour market flows. The assumption that 
the unemployed have a higher probability of being matched with a job in the high-tech sector than 
workers in the traditional sector ( < 1) is important in our model and often used as a simple and 
useful working hypothesis in the literature on unemployment in dual labour markets (e.g., B low 
and Summers, 1986, Burda, 1988, Calvo, 1978, Harris and Todaro, 1970, McCormick, 1990, 
Taubman and Wachter, 1986).  
 
Figure 1. Labour-market flows 
 
To formalise the determination of the labour market equilibrium, we now introduce three value 
functions (Bellman equations; see, e.g., Pissarides, 1990). Let VY, VU, and VT denote the present 
discounted value of expected income streams of a worker in the traditional sector, an unemploy d 
person, and a worker in the high-tech sector, respectively. The worker in the traditional sector 
earns a wage rate of wY and in unit time he expects to get a job in the high-tech sector with 
probability aq, which gives him a surplus of VT  –VY over his current position. VY hus satisfies 
 ( )  ,V Vq+  w= rV YTYY -a   (16) 
where rVY is, in a perfect capital market, the valuation put on having a job in the traditional sector 
(this job may be seen as an asset). This valuation equals the return on the traditional sector job. 
Similarly, we derive
 11
 ( )V Vq  +  wb = rV UTYU - ,  (17) 
  ( ) ( )( )TUTYTT VVVVwrV -h-d+-dh+= 1 . (18) 
The workers discount their income at the nominal interest rate r as they can freely save and borrow 
in the financial market at the nominal interest rate. In equilibrium, it is required that the value of a 
job in the tradiional sector equals the value of being unemployed  
 UY VV = .  (19) 
In addition, we impose two flow-equil brium conditions, guaranteeing a constant allocaion of 
labour over the three states 
 YT qLL a=dh ,  (20) 
 qULT =h-d )1( .  (21) 
Note that we can neglect flows between traditional-sector employment and unemployment because, 
in equilibr um, there is no incentive to alternate between equilibrium strategies that have been 
chosen.10 Employment in the high-tec  sector equals 
 ( )fsrxT LLLLNL +++= .  (22) 
Finally, we have to impose a stock-equilibrium c ndition
 ULLL YT ++= ,  (23) 
so total labour supply L is either employed in one of the two sectors or unemployed. This labour 
market block of the model yields a relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of 
high-tech workers as a function of the relative wage differential w, the unemployment benefit b, he 
acceptance rate of a worker from the traditional sector a, and the interest rate r.  
 By combining the above relations (equations (16) – (19)), we can derive the matching 
probability of an unemployed person with a job in the high-tech sector as a function of the rate of 
interest11 
 
( )( )
( ) ( ).11
1
b
rb
q
aaw
d
---
+-
=  
                                   
10 Take, for example, a worker in the traditional sector. Working in that sector has some value for him, and 
this value consists of current and future earnings. In equilibrium, his v lue i  the same as the value that unem-
ployed workers derive from being unemployed. Now suppose that a traditional sector worker moves to the pool 
of unemployed. The effect of that move is that the value of being unemployed goes down as more unemployed 
people compete for the available high-tech jobs, reducing the inflow rate into the high-tech sec or q. The 
strategy of moving from traditional-sector employment to the unemployment pool will therefore not be chosen 
in equilibrium (and vice versa). 
11 An economically meaningful solution requires 0 < q < 1 so w > [(1–b)(r+d)+(1–ab)]/(1–a). 
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This reveals a positive relation between q and r. We ca also derive a relation between the number 
of unemployed and the number of high-tech workers. This relation follows from the stock and flow 
equilibria on the labour market (equations (20) – (23))12 
 ( ) .11 a-
a
-
a-
a+d
=
L
L
q
q
L
U T
 
According to this equation, the unemployment rate U/L is positively rel d to the number of high-
tech workers and negatively related to the outflow rate out of unemployment (and thereby to the 
interest rate). This can be understood as follows. As more high-tech jobs become availabl (c teris 
paribus), the number of high-tech jobs opening up as a result of lay-offs increases. For a given 
matching probability of unemployed people, this increases the attractiveness of waiting for a high-
tech job as an unemployed job seeker. The unemployment rat  will rise accordingly. An increase in 
the interest rate decreases the unemployment rate since a higher interest rate increases the 
importance attached to current payments. As being unemployed yields a relatively low current pay-
off as compared to a traditional sector job, being in the traditional sector becomes relatively more 
attractive, reducing the unemployment rate (c teris paribus). The model is thus characterised by a 
(partial) negative relation between growth (formally, the interest rate which, as we will see in the 
next section, positively depends on the growth rate) and unemployment.  
 The resulting unemployment in our model has to be thought of as wait unemployment. 
That is, part of the labour force is deliberately queuing up for the high-paid jobs. In the dual 
structure that we have in our model, it is impossible to call this type of unemployment either
voluntary or involuntary. It is voluntary in the sense that the unemployed could, in principle, choose 
to be employed in the traditional sector. It is involuntary, however, as all the unemployed people 
are willing to accept a job in the high- ech sector, but are not offered such a job because of the 
rationing in that sector.
 
3. The steady state of the model 
In this section, we will elaborate on the steady state equilibrium of the model. The system can be 
solved after defining a numéraire (alternatively, we could solve the model in relative prices), and 
after taking into account the definitions for the growth rates that link the levels of consumption, the 
price index of consumption, the level of technology and the shadow price of the level of technology 
with their respective growth rates. Furthermore, we need one more equation to determine the 
                                   
12 To avoid corner solutions (in which all labour would be employed and divided over the two sectors) we 
restrict parameters to cases in which U > 0. 
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number of firms. The number of firms follows from a zero-profit condition according to which 
firms enter or leave the market as long as excss profit are non-zer  (the free entry regime). The 
system jumps to a steady-state growth equilibrium as there are no predetermined rigidities and as 
there are constant returns to scale with respect to knowledge. 
 The free-entry equilibrium is characterised by a zero-profi  condition in the high-tech sector 
     wL+ L+ L + Lxp = Tfsrxx 0)( =-p . 
Using the price equation (13) and the production function (8), this condition can be written as 
 R  
L
LLLL
  
x
fsrx º
+++
=
-e
e
1
. 
R will further be denoted as the firm's 'fixed cost ratio' and equals the mark up. It measures total 
firm size (Lx+Lr+Ls+Lf) in relation to the size of the production department (Lx). The closer goods 
from different firms are substitutes, the lower the mark-up will be. A mark-up implies at the 
fixed costs that the firms can afford in relation to their output are lower. 
 We will now derive the full solution of the model. To start with, notice that in the steady 
state it holds by definition that 
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Labour productivity in the high-tech sector grows at a constant rate, denoted by g. Output of high-
tech goods also grows at rate g, while output of traditional goods is constant. In addition, from 
equations (2) and (3) it can be derived that the steady state circular flow equilibrium is characteri ed 
by 
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Since households spend a constant fraction s on high-tech goods, the macroeconomic rate of 
growth is sg, whereas the relative price PY/px increases at the rate g. Taking he price of the tradi-
tional good as numéraire (PY  = 1), this implies that the price of a high-tech good d creases at the 
rate g. 
 .  
 
r
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The equilibrium growth- and in erest rate can be found by confronting investment behaviour from 
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the firms with savings behaviour from hous olds.13 Savings behaviour satisfies the Ramsey rule. 
This will be called the warranted or required rate of growth. A second relation between the rate of 
growth and the interest rate follows from producer behaviour14 
 .1
1
2 F
R
Rrg x
g
g
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ø
ö
çç
è
æ
--=  
This will be called the planned rate of growth. The solution to the model is depicted in Figure 2. In 
this figure, the line WW represents the warranted rate of growth, while the line PP represents t e 
planned rate of growth. The slope of these curves are 1/[s(r–1)] and R–1–g2R/g1, resp ctiv ly.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium growth and interest rate 
 
Stability of the model is guaranteed if the warranted rate of growth intersects the planned rate of 
                                   
13 In this economy, aggregate income equals wage income Iw (= wT LT+wY LY) plus total dividends (ND). 
Dividends equal high-tec  output (Nxpx) minus production costs (NwT (Lx+Ls+Lf)) and are paid by high-tech 
firms. They equal income from financial assets rA. Investments by high-tech f rms equal NwTLr. Savings 
amount to aggregate income minus consumption expenditure (Iw+ND–YPY –Nxpx). Using the definition for 
dividends, savings thus amount to NwTLr. So, i  equilibrium, aggregate investments equal aggregate savings. 
14 The dynamic equation governing producer behaviour (equation 15) can be written asLx = r/xe (using the 
steady state definition, the definition of the growth rate (equation 1), and equations (13) and (14) from which 
we derive that gpp hh -=/& ). The effort wage elasticity is 1W/(–a+W) (see footnote 4) and is equal to one (see 
equation 1) from which we can solve for W. Substituting this solution for W in equation (12), according to 
which g2W/(–a+W) = Ls/RLx (see also footnote 4), we derive that g2/g1 = Ls/(RLx). It therefore holds that the 
`fixed cost ratio' R equals 1+g/r+Rg2/g1+xF/r. Rewriting this expression yields g = r(R–1–g2R/g1)–xF. 
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growth from above, which holds if (R–1–g2R/g1) > 1/(s(r–1)). An economically meaningful steady 
state equilibrium is characterised by positive growth and interest rates. We can formulate this 
requirement as xF > (R–1–g2R/g1)q. So for the growth and interest rates to be positive, the 
traditional fixed costs need to be large enough. Using that R = /(e–1), th se conditions can be 
written as xF/q > [g1–eg2]/[g1(e–1)] > 1/[s(r–1)] > 0. The details of the solution can be found in 
Appendix B. In the next section, we will discuss the properties of the model in more detail. 
 
4. The properties of the model 
In this section, we will focus attention on the comparative static results that are obtained by 
changing the fixed costs (F), and the effort-monitoring elasticity (g2). The equilibrium interest and 
growth rate follow from confronting the plan ed and warranted rate of growth as derived in section 
3, and using R = e/(e–1). This yields 
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An important remark with respect to the solution for the growth rate is that under free entry the 
equilibrium rate of growth does not depend on the size of the labour force L. This result s 
important in the light of the ongoing debate on the importance of scale effects in models of 
endogenous growth (e.g., Jones, 1995and Young, 1998). 
 We now turn to the comparative static character stics of the model. They are presented in 
Table 1. An increase in the fixed cost requirement (F) unambiguously ncr ases the growth and the 
interest rate. This is explained since large fixed costs will leave limited room for firms with non-
negative profits. As a consequence, (remaining) high-t ch firms will be larger and will have larger 
market shares. This increases their potential to spread the (quasi) fixed costs of R&D over a large 
output and thus increases their incentive to engage in R&D. This will result in large growth rates, 
 16
and relatively large firms that employ more labour in all activities they perform (i.e., production, 
research, monitoring, and managing). This result reveals the Schumpeterian character of our model. 
The increased monitoring intensity (S) will be accompanied by a reduction in the relative wage (w). 
We can unambiguously derive that employment in the high-tech sector increases (see Appendix B). 
In other words, the increase in firm size will always outweigh the reduction in number of firms. Due 
to the terms of trade effect that is associated with the decline in the relative wage, the ratio of 
traditional sector employment to high-tech employment will fall (so the economy becomes more 
high-tech in both absolute and relative terms). Also, wait-unemployment as a fraction of high-tech 
employment (U/LT) declines due to the fact that (i) the relative wage rate declines which implies 
that the return to waiting is smaller and (ii) the interest rate is larger which increases the importance 
attached to current payments and thus makes waiting for a future high-paid job less attractive. Still, 
the effect on the level of traditional employment and unemployment cannot unambiguously be 
derived. Making the assumption that terms of trade effects do not domina e, traditional sector 
employment increases along with high-tech employment and unemployment declines. 
 
Table 1. Comparative static results  
 g r S w Lx Lr Ls LT LY U N BB
15 
F + + + – + + + + ? ? ? – 
g2 + + + n + + + v v n – or v – 
Note: The signs in the cells indicate the signs of the derivatives of the respective variables with respect to the 
parameters under consideration. A 'v' indicates that the variable follows a U-shaped p tern, while a 'n' 
indicates that it follows a hump-shaped pattern. Details on the comparativ statics w.r.t. g2 can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
Finally, we consider the effects of differences in the effort-monitoring lasticity. We consider 
differences in this elasticity as representative of differences in the way work is organise . In our 
view, these differences provide a potential explanation for observed differences in non-competitive 
wage differentials and the bureaucratic burden, but also for differences in the growth- and 
unemployment performance of an economy. In the remainder of this section we will analyse how 
growth, relative wages, unemployment and the sectoral allocation of labour develop as the effort-
monitoring elasticity increases. Since we proceed with a focus on differences in the effort-supervi-
                                   
15 BB represents the bureaucratic den and is defined as BB º (Ls+Lf)/(Lx+Lr+Ls+Lf) = (Ls+Lf)/RLx. 
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sion elasticity and assume g1 to be constant, we can consider the combinations of the relative wage 
and monitoring intensity that result from optimising behaviour as combinations hat are r quired to 
extract a certain (constant) level of effort from workers (note that the effort level equals ag1/[1–g1] 
and is thus independent of g2). In our model, monitoring labour is an additional source of (quasi) 
fixed costs for firms. This implies that the more attractive it becomes for firms to use monitoring 
labour (i.e., th  larger g2) as a means of eliciting effort from workers, the larger the fixed costs will 
be and, analogous to the logic with respect to increases in F, the larger the growth and interest rate 
will be. Along with this increase, the production- and resrch departm nts will become larger in 
size. The effects on the relative wage and the allocation of labour over the three states on the labour 
market are non-monotonous. As the effort-monitoring elasticity increases, firms will initially not 
only increase the amount of monitoring labour they employ, but also the (relative) wage they are 
willing to pay. In other words, the process of effort extraction initially becomes less effective as g2 
increases in that both more monitoring labour and higher wages are required to extract a certain 
amount of effort. Only when the effort-monitoring elasticity surpasses some critical level, relative 
wages start to decline (see Appendix B; of course, for given elasticities, the result that high wages 
are traded off against high monitoring intensities stands upright). 
 The increase in the relative wage will initially make unemployment such an attractive option 
that unemployment will increase (even though the increased interest rate makes waiting relatively 
costly). As the growth rate increases along with g2, w iting will ultimately become so expensive 
that unemployment will decline. This is reinforced once the relative wage starts to decline. The 
development of the size of both the high-t ch and the traditional sector follows a U-shap d pattern 
(the mirror- mage of unemployment which follows a hump-s aped pattern; see Appendix B for 
details on the (relative) development of the allocation of labour). Ultimately, we are left with a 
picture in which countries with a low effort-monitoring e asticity are characterised by low growth, 
low unemployment, a low non-competitive wage differential, and a high bureaucratic burden. At 
the other end of the spectrum are countries with high growth rates, low non-competitive wage 
differentials, low unemployment rates, and a low bureaucratic burden. In intermediate ases, we 
have countries with high relative wages, high unemployment rates and intermediate rates of growth. 
The bottom-line of this exercise is that once we start to study empirically the relation between
growth and unemployment in a cross-s c io of c untries, one should not be too surprised to find a 
partial correlation between growth and unemployment that is neither clearly positive nor negative. 
Differences in institutions like the organisation of work need to be controlled for in a proper and 
complete way in empirical studies.  
 18
 A final general remark with which we conclude this section is that in all the comparative 
static exercises that we discussed, unemployment and high-t ch employ ent ove i  opposite 
directions. This is important in the light of an often heard critique on the standard Harris-Todaro 
type of dual labour market models. Lindbeck an  Snower, 1991, criticize the Harris-Todaro types 
of models for this feature as it is inconsistent with empirical evidence. Our general equilibrium 
framework turns out to overcome this unattractive feature. This result shows the importance of a 
sound general equilibrium framework in which also demand and supply considerations are taken 
into account when analysing the effects of, for example, policy changes (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1991, point at the importance of these general equilibrium effects but do not model them explicitly).  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the implications of different ways of organising work for growth and 
unemployment. The model can best be characterised as a dynamic general equilib um model with a 
non-Walrasian labour market structure. Investment in R&D is a major source of fixed cost and 
therefore of excess profits in imperfectly competitive product markets. The innovative aspect of the 
paper is that incumbent fir s are assumed to be willing to share excess profits with their workers 
due to the presence of an effort-extraction unc ion. Firms trade off high wages against intensive 
monitoring. This results in a dual economy with high-paying jobs in the growth-generatin  high-
tech sector and low-paying jobs in the traditional sector.
 Changes in the way work is organised within firms turned out to affect growth and 
unemployment via various channels. The extent to which firms rely on paying high wages relative 
to intensive montoring was shown to be an important determinant for both growth and 
unemployment. The more firms rely on paying high wages, the larger the non-competitive rents will 
be that workers are searching for, and hence the larger equilibrium unemployment will be. Intensive 
monitoring is a source of fixed costs for firms. Due to the Schumpeterian character of the model in 
which large market shares have a positive influence on the incentives of firms to engage in R&D, 
the monitoring intensity is thus an important determinant of the rate of growth. We finally 
concluded that countries relying heavily on monitoring can thereby afford the payment of low 
relative wages in the process of effort extraction and are characterised by high growth, low 
unemployment, and a low bureaucratic burden. 
 This paper shows that controlling for labour market institutions in a broad sense, including 
factors related to, for example, the organisation of work, is of crucial importance when empirically 
studying the relation between growth and unemployment. The negative relation between growth 
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and unemployment that we found in our theoretical model may remain unnoticed in empirical 
research due to cross-country differences that have not been taken into account. One should 
therefore not be too surprised that the partial relation between growth and unemployment is neither 
clearly positive nor negative (see also Bean and Pissarides, 1993,N ckell and Layard, 1997, for an 
overview of theoretical and empirical studies on growth and unemployment). Although an 
empirical investigation on the relation between growth and unemployment is beyond the scope of 
this paper, we think that this is an interesting way to go and may yield new insights. 
 
Appendix A. Derivation of equations (4) – (15)
On the producer side of the model we assume that high-tech firms compe e monopolistically. Each 
firm, producing a unique brand of the high-tech goo , is assumed to maximise its present 
discounted value: 
 ò
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The 'current value' Hamiltonian corresponding to this optimisation problem is 
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where phi is the shadow price of the level of technology hi. This shadow price is a measure of the 
marginal value of an additional unit of h for he firm. 
 The first order conditions of this maximisation problem are 
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We now invoke the symmetry assumption. From equation (A.11) it directly follows that firms 
engage in mark-up pricing (equation (13) in the text). Equation (A.12) yields the optimal R&D 
input (equation (14) in the text). Equation (A.13) is the dynamic equation governing the allocation 
of high-tech labour over time. Using equations (A.11) and (A.12) and rewriting yields equ tion 
(15) in the text. Finally, substituting equation  (A.11) and (A.12) into equations (A.9) and (A.10) 
we get the set of 'Solow-conditions' (equations (11) and (12) in the text). 
 
Appendix B. Solution of the complete model
The reduced system of equations from which we can solve the complete model consists of the 
equations16: 
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16 Equation (B.5) is derived using goods-market equilibrium according to which spending on the available 
goods is divided according to (1–s)/s = YPY/(Nxpx) = LYwY(e–1)/(NLxewT). 
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Combining the planned and warranted rate of growth (equations (B.1) and (B.2)) we can derive the 
equilibrium rate of growth and the interest rate as  
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The number of production workers now follows from equation (B.4) 
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Using equations (B.3), (B.5), (B.6), and (B.7), high-tech employment, tradit onal employment and 
unemployment can now be written as a function of the parameters of the model, the umber of 
firms, N, the relative wage, w, and R. Substituting the expressions for LT, LY, and U into equation 
(B.8), we can solve for the equilibrium number of firms as a function of R a d the relative wage
(which can also be written as a function of R) 
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Comparative Statics 
The comparative static characteristics as described in the text and in Table 1 with respect to r, g, S,
Lx(= r/xe), Lr(= g/xe) and Ls = S/e are straightforwardly derived by taking first order derivatives. 
The comparative static results with respect to the bureaucratic burden can be derived by solving for 
the bureaucratic burden as 
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and taking derivatives with respect to the parameters under consideration. To consider the effects 
of a change in g2 on the relative wage as discussed in section 4, we derive from (B.10) that
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At low levels of g2, this derivative is positive (ln(S) tends to –¥ as g2 approaches zero from above). 
So at small values of g2, w is increasing in g2. The second order derivative is negative so eventually 
w becomes a declining function of g2. The comparative static characteristics of w are then ea ily 
derived as reported in Table 1.  
 We finally have to determine the comparative static results with respect to the allocation of 
labour and the number of high-tech firms. To derive the results we write labour market equilibrium 
using (B.3), (B.5), (B.6), (B.7), andR=e/(e–1) as 
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The comparative static effects of an increase in F are as follows. Since the interest rate increases 
and the relative wage declines, we know from equation (B.17) that NLx inc eas s so high-tech 
employment increases. The effects on unemployment and traditi al ment ar  ambiguous. In 
the economically most reasonable case where inter-sectoral t rms of trade effects do not dominate, 
LY increases and unemployment declines. We can, howev r, not preclude a priori that traditional 
sector employment declines and unemployment i creases.  The effects of b do not depend on the 
sign of g2 since changes in b leave the relative wage rate unaffected. 
 The effects of changes in g2 on th  allocation f labour are non-monotonous. We know that 
r is increasing in g2. We have also seen that w reaches a maximum value at some g2. We define this 
value as g2w. Starting from this point, we will now derive the relative position of the peaks and/or 
troughs of the sectoral labour shares in several steps. The derivatives of variables of interest w.r.t. 
g2 at different values of g2 are summarized in Table B.1 that is constructed on the basis of the 
following reasoning:   
 
(i) Using equation (B.17), we know that at g2w, LT (= RNLx) is increasing since w s constant 
and r is increasing. So by using goods-market equilibrium (equation 1), w  c n conclude 
that also LY is increasing in g2 at g2w. Unemployment is thus decreasing in g2 at g2w.  
(ii) When g2<g2w, both w and r are increasing in g2. At low values of g2, the increase in the 
relative wage rate is strong relative to the increase in r, so NLx is decreasing. At some value 
for g2 which we define as g2LT, LT (= NRLx) reaches a minimum. At this point,LY is 
increasing in g2 sincew is increasing. Unemployment is thus decreasing in g2 at g2LT.
(iii) The strong increase in w at low levels of g2 exerts an upward pressure on unemployment, 
where unemployment reaches a maximum at a point we define asg2U. At th s value, 
traditional sector employment is increasing in g2 si ce high-tech employment is decreasing. 
(iv) LY reaches a minimum at g2LY which must be to the left of g2LT.
 
The effects on N follow by using that N = LT/RLx  = LTxe/Rr. At low values of g2, LT is decreasing in 
g2, while r is increasing in g2, so N is unambiguously decreasing, until LT starts to increase. From 
this point onwards, we cannot unambiguously conclude that N is decreasing in g2.  
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Table B.1. Derivative of variables of interest w.r.t. g2 at different values of g2  
  g2LY < g2U < g2LT < g2w  
w + + + + + + + 0 – 
r + + + + + + + + + 
LT – – – – – 0 + + + 
U + + + 0 – – – – – 
LY – 0 + + + + + + + 
N – – – – – – ? ? ? 
 
Appendix C. Some numerical simulations 
In this appendix, we perform some numerical experiments to get a feeling for the comparative static 
characteristics of the model and the sensitivity of the model with respect to parameter changes. We 
start from a set of base-line parameters that is given in Table C.1. These parameters result in 
g=3.176%, w=1.08, U=10.99, LT =51.69, LY =37.31, Lx =2.67, Lr =0.73, Ls =0.22, N=12.90 and 
q=0.127. Based on the constraints that we imposed in the main text (0<q<1, U>0, g>0, and 
stability of the model), we derived extreme bounds of the parameter value . These are given in 
Table C.1.
 
Table C.1. Base values parameters and extreme bounds 
 Base min max  Base min max 
x 0.02 0.0104 0.0323 g1 0.7 0.6925 0.9999 
F  0.8 0.4143 1.0536 g2  0.04 0 0.0501 
q 0.02 0.0048 0.0386 a 0.925 0.9018 ¥ 
s  0.6 0.5553 1 c 3 0.0001 3.0773 
r 6 5.5606 ¥ a 0.25 0.0001 0.3790 
e  3 2.1001 3.1320 d 0.05 0.0186 1 
L 100 0.0001 ¥ b  0.96 0.9268 0.9999 
 
Comparative static characteristics are presented by graphical means in Figures C.1 – C.3. These 
pictures show t e impact of the respective parameters on the endogenous variables under 
consideration. Starting from the base-l e, the figure reveals what values the endogenous variables 
take when one parameter of interest deviates from its base-line value. In the figures we put the 
value of the endogenous variable under consideration on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis we 
depict the value of the parameter under consideration as a proportion of its base-l n  value
(assuming all other variables remain unchanged).  
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 Figure C.1 Relative wage            Figure C.2 Unemployment              Figure C.3 Growth rate
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